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1 ABSTRACT 
Urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa has led to the proliferation of peri-urban settlements close to cities. 
Residents who have local tribal as well as migrant backgrounds in these spaces often take land matters into 
their own hands leading to diverse land transactions. This paper is based on field research on Domboshava, a 
peri-urban communal area located 20km northeast of Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. In this peri-urban 
communal area, land transactions are shifting from customary inheritance in the tribal line to individualized 
land transactions such as direct land sales and renting – prompting the local authority (Goromonzi Rural 
District Council) to propose rezoning as a solution to increased land transactions in in this peri-urban 
communal area. This strategy has however become part of the problem as land transactions proliferated 
ahead of the implementation of the rezoning strategy. Forty-one local residents, as well as a number of key 
informants such as Traditional Leaders and local government officials were sampled for the study. 
Qualitative and quantitative data were collected through structured interviews, review of pertinent 
documents, as well as observation. I used Hirschman (1970)’s voice, exit, and loyalty model to reveal the 
reactions of community residents to the local authority’s rezoning strategy (as a solution to proliferation of 
land transactions), as well as to demonstrate the community residents’ criticism or disregard of, or 
compliance with this strategy. My findings reveal that when community residents find themselves stuck 
within planning strategies they perceive as dysfunctional, they react differently to their situation. Often, this 
compounds the problems. Appropriate planning strategies that address the challenges in Domboshava are 
sorely needed. 
Acknowledgement: Since this paper is based on my PhD thesis, I would like to acknowledge the Graduate 
School at Stellenbosch University in South Africa for funding the research, and the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) for funding my fieldwork. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
Urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa has led to the proliferation of peri-urban settlements close to cities. Land 
transactions in these spaces are on the increase. In Zimbabwe, a number of communal areas are located on 
the periphery of cities - the peri-urban. Over the years, the influence of urban development has shifted into 
these zones. These peri-urban communal areas signal the outward movement of the edges of cities (see 
Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). As cities spread and expand further into the countryside, they always absorb 
farmland and villages (Tacoli, 2002; Berry, 2011; Mabin, 2012). Local administrative authorities often lack 
the capacity to deal with challenges in peri-urban areas (Tacoli, 2008). Peri-urban areas also experience 
various kinds of land transactions because of unclear physical and institutional boundaries that regulate 
conditions of access to common property resources and land use in these areas (Tacoli, 2002). Land 
transactions entail the different kinds of land rights exchanges within and outside the procedures of land 
tenure systems (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). 
This entails individualization and privatization of access to land by locals and even strangers (Owusu, 2008; 
Maxwell et al., 1998; Peters; 2007). Chauveau & Colin (2010) refer to land transactions as customary land 
transfers framed outside the legal procedures. In many instances, these land exchanges include selling, 
renting, inheriting, and in some instances land grabs. 
The notion of communal land rights and access to land under the communal system of land tenure in sub-
Saharan Africa is however variable, contingent, and relevant to social and political contexts in which it is 
applied (Sjaastad & Cousins 2008). For example in West Africa, several systems of land tenure co-exist with 
none completely dominating the other, and there are no legal land holding rights that exist among community 
residents (Delville, 2000). In South Africa communal land tenure is defined in Chapter 1 of the Communal 
Lands Rights Act (CLRA) 11 of 2004 of South Africa as, “land occupied or used by members of a 
community subject to the rules or custom of the community” (Cousins, 2008b:109). In Zimbabwe, 
communal land is administered through a plethora of Acts including the Communal Lands Act (CLA) 
Chapter 20:04 of 2002, TLs Act (TLA) Chapter 29:17 of 2001, the Regional Town and Country Planning 
Land Transactions and Rezoning Strategies in the Peri Urban Communal Area of Domboshava, Zimbabwe: Challenges and Pitfalls 
380 
   
REAL CORP 2015: 
PLAN TOGETHER – RIGHT NOW – OVERALL 
 
 
 
 
Act (RTCPA) Chapter 29:12 of 2001, and the Rural District Council Act (RDCA) Chapter 29:13 of 2002. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act of 2013 section 332 (b) (iii) defines communal 
land as “land set aside under an Act of Parliament and held in accordance with customary law by members of 
a community under the leadership of a Chief”. The CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002 defines communal land as, 
“land which immediately before the 1st of February 1983 was Tribal Trust land ... vested in the President 
who shall permit it to be occupied and be used.” The administration of communal land is thus enabled 
through the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Acts of Parliament (statutes). The Rural District Councils 
(RDCs) as the local authorities administer these Acts on behalf of the state on one hand, together with 
traditional authorities (Chiefs, Headmen, and Village Heads (VHs)) on the other hand. Both the state and 
traditional authorities hold important roles in administration of communal land in Zimbabwe. 
Communal land tenure in Zimbabwe provides for access and use of land parcels to residents in communal 
areas as individuals and as collectives. Communal land in Zimbabwe like in most sub-Saharan Africa 
belongs to the state, and individuals lack rights to dispose of land at will since ‘communal’ implies some 
form of collectivity (Cousins, 1990; Nyambara, 2001; Cousins, 2000; Bennett, 2008). This system of land 
tenure therefore represents sets of elusive relations often overlapping and nested with regards the rights to 
access land and other resources (Cousins, 2000; Cousins, 2007; Cousins, 2008b; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008). 
This context in Zimbabwe like in most African countries does not only demonstrate pluralism of the 
communal land tenure system in terms of its content, but the legal pluralism in terms of statutory provisions 
that also regulate communal rights to land (Delville, 2000; Nyambara, 2001; Berry, 2002; Wehrmann, 2008; 
Cousins, 2009). However, in the minds of  many land users in Zimbabwe and generally in most sub-Saharan 
Africa, “communal land belongs not to single individuals, but to a vast family of which many are dead, few 
are living and countless numbers are still unborn” (Berry, 1992:342; Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006:349). 
This also shows polarization and overlapping of rights and institutions that regulate land with the state as the 
sole owner of the land on one hand, and community user groups on the other (Nyambara, 2001; Wehrmann, 
2008; Cousins, 2009). 
3 THE STUDY AREA 
This paper is based on case study of Domboshava, a peri-urban communal area. The peri-urban communal 
area of Domboshava is situated twenty kilometres northeast of Harare. In terms of local governance, 
Domboshava is considered a rural area, and falls under traditional authority, and Goromonzi Rural District 
Council (GRDC) as the local authority. Land in Domboshava falls under communal land tenure system, and 
is administered under the system of customary land tenure. A combination of statutes on land and settlement, 
and local customs and tradition legally constitute the structure that regulates access to land in this peri-urban 
communal area. The legal instruments include the CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002, the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 
2001, the RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001, and the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002. The prevalence of land 
transactions in Domboshava presents complex institutional challenges on this structure prompting the local 
authority to propose rezoning as a solution to increased land exchanges. 
Two important kinds of households were identified in Domboshava. These are tribal and migrant 
households. Tribal households are those with historically sanctioned rights to communal land under the 
system of customary land tenure. Tribal members comprise individuals born and bred in Domboshava often 
with a lengthy lineage history to this area. Tribal households and their members are presumed to ‘own’ land 
(in communal areas) that supposedly belongs to their ancestors (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon; 
1976). The tribal status is therefore associated with individuals’ long-term autochthonous relationship with 
particular land parcels, belonging, as well as ‘ownership’ of land in this rural area (cf. Berry, 2011). By 
virtue of their tribal identity and land claims through descent from the original inhabitants and ‘owners’ of 
land in Domboshava, tribal households and their members practice peasant farming if they so wish, and are 
able to bequeath land. On the other hand, migrants are outsiders without legitimate lineage land rights in 
Domboshava. Migrants constitute a diverse group of strangers in terms of aspects such as place of origin, 
language, culture, and ethnicities. Migrant households migrated from elsewhere to live in this communal 
area. Migrants nevertheless acquired land sometimes within the system of customary land tenure. 
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4 THE PROBLEM 
The unprecedented level of land transactions experienced in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava 
has prompted Goromonzi Rural District Council as a local authority to propose rezoning as solution to this 
peri-urban challenge. This approach was meant to curb land transactions such as direct land sales and land 
grabs through upgrading rural land to urban land with title. However, the rezoning strategy became part of 
the problem as land transactions proliferated ahead of the implementation of the rezoning strategy. 
4.1 The aim of the study 
This paper seeks to highlight the reactions of the peri-urban community residents of Domboshava when they 
found out that the local authority, Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC) sought to implement rezoning 
strategies as a way of curbing land transactions. This aim was guided by the following sub-problem 
questions: 
(1) What constitutes the rezoning strategy in Domboshava? 
(2) How did the community residents react to the rezoning strategy?  
(3) Why did the community residents of Domboshava reacted to the rezoning strategies? 
5 THE CONCEPT CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN ZIMBABWE 
In most sub-Saharan African countries, land rights of local community residents are often overshadowed by 
provisions of codified statutory laws as these are applied concurrently with customary land tenure provisions 
(Delville, 2000). According to Adams et al. (1999), this situation is also apparent in Zimbabwe where 
communal tenure is not only providing a conflation of tenure regimes, but also interchangeably refers to 
customary land tenure. However, communal and customary land tenure systems do not necessarily mean the 
same (Cousins, 2009). They represent a dualism (Mamdani, 2000). The provisions and conditions for land 
use under communal and customary land tenure systems overlap. Customary land tenure like the communal 
tenure system defines the conditions on which land can be accessed, held, and used in most rural areas of 
sub-Saharan Africa. Peters (2004) views customary land tenure as a pre-colonial oral system on land rights 
merely put into writing through the land law. Customary land tenure is governed by land relations among the 
community members, and is viewed as tribal law or simply custom, and “its claim was not to guarantee 
rights but to enforce tradition” (Mamdani, 2000:101). Delville (2000:98) describes customary land tenure as 
“‘procedural’ and not codified”. Written procedures on the practice of customary land tenure unlike 
communal land tenure are absent. Customary land tenure systems are largely shaped by local interests and 
institutions (O’Flaherty, 1998). Customary land tenure features cultural and religious symbolisms rooted in 
local customs and tradition of community residents as land ‘ownership’ is vested in local traditional 
authorities (Christodoulou, 1990; Delville, 2000; Mamdani, 2000; Mathieu et al., 2003; Wehrmann, 2008). 
These local traditions and customs define the context in which people “live their lives” (Giddens, 2001:643). 
Individuals and collectives under customary land tenure assume rights to hold and use land without title 
(Moyo, 1995; Cousins, 2009). Customary land tenure systems do not define each person’s rights by which 
they access and obtain resources (Chauveau, 1998 in Delville, 2000:98). Customary land tenure implies 
collective rights to land, as well as other natural resources in communal areas (Cousins, 2009). Under 
customary land tenure, communal residents hold kinship rights to land, and they can always claim such 
rights even after their long absence from their communities (Christodoulou, 1990). The tenets of customary 
land tenure lie within the norms, beliefs, and values of communities often connected to ancestral spirits 
(Ibid). These principles of customary land tenure continue to apply in most rural sub-Saharan Africa even 
though the circumstances in terms of traditional authority, socio-economic conditions, and rights themselves 
are not universal, homogenous, and evolve over time (Delville, 2000). Customary land tenure in Zimbabwe 
is defined through the custom of communities where it is applied, and in turn, these communities are 
definable and identifiable through such custom. Traditional Leaders remain the custodians of customary land 
tenure. 
5.1 Administration of customary land tenure in Zimbabwe 
Administration of land and property rights under customary land tenure in communal areas in most sub-
Saharan Africa is through both statutes (laws) and traditional system of authority. Under these 
circumstances, TLs have limited authority to administer land rights under customary land tenure. For 
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example, in South Africa and the post-independence era in Zimbabwe pursued changes on the colonial 
version of the role of TLs on land, as well as the land tenure in most rural areas commonly referred to as 
native reserves (Cliffe et al., 2011). However, in the post-apartheid era in South Africa many TLs still derive 
their powers not only from tradition and custom, but also “from colonial and apartheid constructs embodied 
in previous laws” (Claassens, 2008:361). In Zimbabwe, the post-independence era also witnessed changes in 
the administrative role of traditional authorities on land as these roles were transferred to local authorities 
referred to as RDCs by the government (Cliffe et al., 2011). Although these changes were institutionalized, 
the presence and the current roles of TLs as part of the state remain. For example, the Chiefs retain their 
legislative, judicial, executive, and administrative roles which they enmesh with tradition (cf. Mamdani, 
2000). Chapter 15 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe institutionalizes these roles of TLs. However, the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe neither elaborates nor provides clear guidelines on how the traditional authorities 
and local authorities such as RDCs complement their roles particularly on land administration in communal 
areas. 
In Zimbabwe, traditional authorities comprise Chiefs, Headmen, and VHs. Institutionalization of traditional 
authority and traditional leadership varies from country to country in sub-Saharan Africa, and is done in line 
with local tradition and custom. These traditional authorities do not necessarily derive their power from laws 
(statutes) per se, but from local tradition and custom, and are expected to observe the laws in the discharge of 
their duties (O’Flaherty, 1998). For example, in South Africa, TLs administer land rights under the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) 41 of 2003 (Claassens, 2008; Love, 
2008). In Ghana, the ‘non-interference in chieftaincy affairs’ policy is one of the important legal instruments 
used in the administration of communal land (Ubink, 2008 in Peters, 2010). The policy on ‘non-interference 
in chieftaincy affairs’ empowers TLs to act as they please, discharge political power, act as government 
‘voter-brokers’, and thus the “fallacy of a strict division between ‘traditional’ leaders and modern 
government and party politics is clear” (Ubink, 2008 in Peters, 2010:606). In Ghana, Chiefs have more 
power to adjudicate on land issues (Crook, 2008 in Peters, 2010). In Zimbabwe, TLs perform their roles 
under the guidance of the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001. In most African countries, it is the role of local 
authorities to administer the statutes on land on behalf of the state. In Zimbabwe, it is the role of RDCs to 
administer communal land under customary land tenure on behalf of the state. In this regard, it is therefore 
unlawful to allocate land without the collective consent of both the RDCs and TLs as the custodians of land 
on behalf of the state. 
The relationships between the state and TLs on land administration under customary land tenure in sub-
Saharan Africa vary from country to country. These relationships are localized, and are never homogeneous. 
Different countries vest different degrees of power and authority on TLs since African traditions, cultures, 
norms, values, and rituals are themselves divergent. The influence of statutory regulation on traditional 
authorities in most sub-Saharan Africa is never neutral (Claassens, 2008). Although the role of traditional 
authority is obscured by the role of the state through laws, their influence in land administration cannot be 
underestimated (Okoth-Ogendo; 2008). Struggles on land administration in communal areas clearly exist. 
Under these circumstances, the critical question that needs clarity is on ‘who’ has authority over land 
(Cousins, 2008a). Love (2008) views these struggles in terms of whose voices are heard, and whose are 
silenced. Berry (2002) relates the struggles to who should have access to land rights and the terms of 
reference on which the rights are exercised. I therefore conceptualize traditional authority as an institution 
that regulates access and allocation of land rights under customary land tenure comprising the VHs, 
Headmen, and the Chief. 
5.2 Strategies for rezoning communal land in Zimbabwe 
Rezoning strategies in urban and regional planning discourses take a variety of forms. In Zimbabwe, 
rezoning strategies involve government programmes that seek to correct colonial imbalances. For example, 
the villagization programmes that dominated development initiatives soon after independence (see Potts & 
Mutambirwa, 1990; Nyambara, 2001; Spierenburg, 2004; Thebe, 2010). This entails integration and 
application of regulations to support effective land use and land use planning. Rezoning originates from 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence decentralization programmes when local authorities sought to create small 
rural towns called growth-points in an endeavor to modernize the rural areas. Small rural towns were 
expected to develop in a linear hierarchy to become fully urbanized (Helmsing et al., 1991; Munzwa, & 
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Jonga, 2010). The settlement hierarchy proceeds from what are known as business centres, rural service 
centres, growth points, towns, and ultimately to cities (Helmsing et al., 1991; Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). The 
purpose of the settlement hierarchy was to curb rural-urban migration by bringing similar urban services 
closer to the people living in the rural areas (Tacoli, 1998; Helmsing et al., 1991). The approach was meant 
to harmonize urban spread into rural areas (Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). In this regard, rezoning simply implies 
conversion of rural spaces to urban. Thus, rezoning is transit oriented as it seeks to apply strategies that 
create easthetic city peripheries that will eventaully merge with the greater urban zone. 
6 METHODS 
In this study, forty-one local residents as well as a number of key informants such as Traditional Leaders and 
local government officials were sampled Qualitative and quantitative data were collected through structured 
interviews, review of pertinent documents, as well as observation. The mixed methods approach that 
combines qualitative and quantitative approaches was thus employed in this case study. In order to highlight 
the reactions of community residents to rezoning of Domboshava, Hirschman (1970)’s voice, exit, and 
loyalty model was used in data analysis. This model addresses the different responses consumers are able to 
make when faced with poor and declining markets. Exit means quitting (Bekker & Leilde, 2003), or simply 
leaving (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976). Voice means speaking out (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 
1974) or “staying put and shouting” (Laver, 1976:464). Loyalty means ‘stay and be silent’ (Hirschman, 
1970; Barry, 1974). Loyalty also entails to ‘simply stick it out’ or ‘grin and bear it’ (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 
1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Through Hirschman’s model, I was able not only to reveal the reaction of 
community residents to the local authority’s rezoning strategy, but to demonstrate their criticism or disregard 
of, or compliance with this strategy. 
7 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS: THE REACTION OF COMMUNITY RESIDENTS TO 
REZONING STRATEGIES IN DOMBOSHAVA 
In Domboshava, land transactions are shifting from customary inheritance in the tribal line to individualized 
land transactions such as direct land sales and renting - leading to changes in land use, settlement patterns, 
and increased population densities – prompting the GRDC to implement rezoning as a solution to land 
transactions. In this section, I explain the nature of the rezoning strategies proposed for Domboshava, the 
reaction of community residents to these strategies, and the reasons why they community residents reacted 
the way they did. 
7.1 Rezoning strategies in Domboshava 
From the perspective of Local Government Officers at GRDC, rezoning constitutes settlement upgrading 
from rural to urban. This strategy is guided by statutes on land and settlement, as well as a master plan for 
Domboshava. These statutes include the CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002, TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001, the 
RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001, and the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002. The master plan for Domboshava 
was prepared in line with the GRDC’s proposal to upgrade the communal area from rural to urban. The 
master plan provides for the orderly and planned layout of physical structures in this communal area 
concomitant with urban spaces. The practice of upgrading settlements from rural to urban is however not a 
new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. The strategy aims at urbanizing communal areas in line with the provisions 
of section three of the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002. In this case rezoning translates to spatial issues 
reflected on master plans.  
From the perspective of Local Government Officers, the mixed and unplanned settlement pattern emerging 
from villages of Domboshava as a result of migrants settling in this communal area conflicted with the 
principles of planning on conviviality, city imaging, and the beauty concomitant with international 
destinations such as Harare. As such, beautification of Domboshava was inescapable because of the location 
of this communal area in the periphery of the capital city. The Local Government Officers regarded 
Domboshava as one of Harare’s frontiers because “we approach cities from their rear” (Mabin, 2012). Thus, 
settlement upgrading as a rezoning strategy was justifiable as a response to settlement growth of 
Domboshava, and the urban expansion of Harare into its periphery because of increased land transactions. 
This justification however ordinarily seeks to preserve the image of Harare, and not necessarily that of 
Domboshava. On the other hand, by trying to beautify Domboshava and to avoid ‘another Epworth in the 
Land Transactions and Rezoning Strategies in the Peri Urban Communal Area of Domboshava, Zimbabwe: Challenges and Pitfalls 
384 
   
REAL CORP 2015: 
PLAN TOGETHER – RIGHT NOW – OVERALL 
 
 
 
 
making’ as highlighted by some of the Local Government Officers at GRDC, these land use planners sought 
to restructure the traditional system of customary land tenure through the proposed master plan since 
Domboshava was ‘degenerating’ into an ‘informal settlement’ like Epworth located in the eastern side of 
Harare. 
The GRDC as an agent of the state has the power to propose and impose the settlement upgrading strategy 
for purposes of the beautification of rural settlements. In the event of resistance by community residents, 
section thirty seven of the RTCPA Chapter 29:13 of 2002 authorizes the GRDC to use necessary force in 
order to achieve the planning ideals. 
Since the situation in Domboshava presents uncoordinated and overcrowded residential structures from the 
perspective of GRDC, this meant application of clean-up measures akin to Operation 
Murambatsvina/Operation Restore Order (OM/ORO) experienced in Zimbabwe in 2005. This strategy 
involves the demolition of structures perceived as discordant, illegal, and substandard in physical and 
planning terms. Ironically, the situation in Domboshava emanates from previous displacements of 
households through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP of 2002) and OM/ORO of 2005 (see 
Tibaijuka, 2005; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Kamete, 2011; Kamete, 2012). Forced eviction of households and 
the destruction of dwellings has been the general response to substandard and informal structures by local 
authorities in Zimbabwe (Kamete & Lindell, 2010). Clean-up measures were also applied in Gutu in 
Masvingo on households that settled themselves on ungazetted land (see Mujere, 2011). Police destroyed 
houses and burnt down crops to force people to return to their original places (Ibid). Thus, the proposed 
rezoning strategy by the Local Government Officers for Domboshava could possibly resuscitate a vicious 
cycle of displacement in this peri-urban communal area. Quan & Payne (2008:4) also point out that, 
evictions “lead to the creation of new unauthorized settlements elsewhere, only moving the problem from 
one location to another at great social, economic, and occasionally political cost”. In this regard, GRDC’s 
understanding of rezoning does not take cognisance of the causes behind the status quo, and is rather 
divorced from the lived experiences, as well as polarized expectations of community residents from 
rezoning. 
7.2 Tribal members’ reactions to rezoning strategies, and the reasons for their actions  
The reactions of tribal and migrant members of Domboshava to rezoning strategies were different. Tribal 
members in Domboshava perceived the rezoning strategy through settlement upgrading as a hidden agenda 
by the GRDC to dispossess them of their tribal land rights. In their minds, the proposal was meant to 
generate revenue to the benefit of the GRDC. Yet, from the perspective of Local Government Officers, land 
in rural areas or reserves is simply ‘reserved’ for future development.  As a result, tribal members sold ‘their’ 
land to migrants ahead of the implementation of the rezoning strategy - to frustrate the local authority. By 
selling land directly to migrants, tribal members also sought to benefit somehow (perhaps in monetary terms) 
from their customary land rights. As these tribal members sold their land to migrants, in essence they simply 
transferred their land rights, and not necessarily land because communal land in Zimbabwe belongs to the 
state. According to Toulmin & Quan (2000), such circumstances are very tricky because the state continues 
to ‘own' land despite local changes. Yet, tribal members perceived their customary land rights as 
unchallengeable in Domboshava. The problem lies within the levels of decision-making between the 
traditional authorities and the GRDC who both claim to have power to allocate land to migrants, yet in legal 
terms the GRDC on behalf of the state overrides the powers of localized structures (see Cousins, 2008a). 
However, rules under the tradition and customs of tribal members of Domboshava remain authoritative and 
provide a sense of legitimacy in regulating individual behaviour in land transactions although these rules are 
largely unwritten and unspoken (cf. Cousins, 2008b). The reactions of tribal members to proposed 
implementation of rezoning strategies in Domboshava were largely shaped by familiar experiences that 
happened elsewhere, for example, the case of Seke communal area in Zimbabwe.  From Hirschman (1970)’s 
perspective, other consumers’ behaviour as well as the market experiences from elsewhere influence the 
decision and choices made on the market. 
Tribal members collectively voiced their concerns and disapproval of the settlement upgrading strategy 
through organizing themselves and sending village representatives to negotiate with the GRDC. By voicing 
to the GRDC, tribal members sought redress on a rezoning proposal they regarded as disruptive and 
undesirable. Although, settlement upgrading paves way to planned activities on the master plan, the layout 
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for residential, commercial, industrial, and institutional spaces on the master plan are inadequate to cover the 
ever-increasing population of Domboshava. For example, the master plan covers only two hundred and 
eleven residential units. According to Local Government Officers, residential structures deemed substandard 
are likely to be excluded from the new layout. This means possible exclusion of residential structures of 
some tribal members whose residences are old and dilapidated. Yet, residential structures in rural areas of 
Zimbabwe are never built according to plans. There exists no layouts for rural settlements in Zimbabwe. In 
the minds of tribal members, creating order and beautification in Domboshava through rezoning is a false 
justification for imaging Domboshava. Thus, Walker (2009:474) notes that, 
“Laws and policy prescriptions that underestimate the distinction between the economic and the social values 
of land run the risk of being implementable. What is important here is that the social meanings of land are 
constructed differently at different levels - individual, household, community, nation - and the interplay 
among these different levels is significant for determining how rights-based claims to land get framed by 
ordinary women and men”. 
Reactions of tribal members also reveal the multiple meanings, and the symbolic relationship they derive 
from land. As in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, tribal members of Domboshava base their rights to land on history 
and indigeneity (cf. Peters, 2010). In Domboshava, customary land rights and attachment to the community 
characterizes the belonging of tribal members. Belonging is embedded not only in the structure on the system 
of customary land tenure, but also in the social system. Thus, the meaning of land goes beyond its use value, 
to a linkage between generations, and as “a potent element for social identity” (Walker, 2003:116). Thus, the 
symbolic relevance of land is associated with the lived experiences of tribal members. For tribal members of 
Domboshava, land is a critical source of community cohesion that carries both communal and individual 
interests of the users (cf. Mathieu et al., 2003; Cousin, 2008b). Land is an important productive resource, as 
well as a potent symbol of their past (Cousins, 2008b). Clearly, land in Domboshava is not only a spatial 
entity that defines the territorial boundaries of the communal area, but a physical asset and entitlement used 
by community residents and passed to the next generations. Land is rather a determinant of “socio-physical 
realities that are significant to human well-being” (cf. Walker, 2009: 467). 
The major concern of tribal households of Domboshava about the rezoning strategy was the risk of possible 
relocation to an unspecified place elsewhere - possibly to Gokwe - a dry and tsetsefly infested communal 
area located almost 350kilometres northwest of Harare. The recurrent question asked by tribal members 
particularly those advanced in age and those with ailing health was - where do we go from here? However, 
possible relocation of households to new places shows that the individual and collective land rights of 
community residents of Domboshava were rather insecure. According to Cousins (2008b), displacement of 
communities affects individuals’ land rights in many ways. In Domboshava, forced eviction and relocation 
of tribal households implies displacement of these people from their homeland. Through rezoning, tribal 
members risk being ‘pushed out’ of their community through clean-up measures akin to ORO/OM of 2005 - 
a complete departure from the rational comprehensive models in planning to politics of muddling through 
(Lindblom, 1959; McLaughlin, 1987). Direct land sales by tribal members of Domboshava are therefore a 
voice to the GRDC and an expression of discontent and non-approval of what they viewed as unwarranted 
clean-ups and possible relocation. It is an attempt to solicit attention from the GRDC as well as the state. 
From the GRDC’s perspective, policy processes on rezoning aim at improving access to services such as 
water, electricity, and sanitation - largely expected by residents in most communal areas of Zimbabwe. 
However, tribal members from Domboshava perceived services initiated by the GRDC as inferior, and were 
thus not excited about services accompanied by clean-up measures. Effectiveness of the tribal members’ 
voice to bring the desired change also depends upon the GRDC’s willingness to listen and to respond to 
community concerns. This impasse emanates from accompanying rezoning with laws on land and settlement. 
These laws grant the GRDC more power to control the practice of rezoning particularly through settlement 
upgrading. 
Voice and exit strategies by tribal household members in Domboshava did not bring the desired change 
therefore loyalty naturally took precedence. According to Hirschman (1970), the loyalty strategy entails 
keeping exit at bay, while activating voice and continuing to campaign for change from within. Loyalty also 
entails to ‘simply stick it out’ or ‘grin and bear it’ while advocating for redress (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 
1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Tribal members advanced in age with little ability to build new homesteads 
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from scratch elsewhere demonstrated loyalty. The elderly argued that their roots and tribal identity belong to 
Domboshava, and that they invested social capital and networks in this communal area (cf. Chambers & 
Conway, 1991; Ellis & Biggs, 2001; Cahn, 2002; Cousins, 2007; Scoones, 2009). Leaving Domboshava for 
other places elsewhere was inconceivable since their ancestors were buried in this communal area. In this 
regard, loyalty entails vigilance while waiting and adapting to the deteriorating conditions in anticipation of 
uncertainties, and not necessarily change for the better. 
Tribal members of Domboshava also reacted to rezoning through resisting projects from GRDC they 
perceived as suspicious. According to Hirschman (1970), when people are suspicious of new products, they 
are likely to resist or boycott the products by simply not buying them. The GRDC intended to install piped 
water in Zimbiru Village. As much as tribal members in Domboshava looked forward to sources of clean 
water closer to their homesteads, the piped water project was perceived as a deceptive precursor for a 
rezoning strategy that needed to be resisted, rejected, and boycotted. Tribal members from Domboshava 
were not excited about the water project. They viewed the project as a form of interference with their rural 
life. They believed in rezoning strategies that valued their communal status even though they were fully 
aware that the communal area was situated in a peri-urban zone that is likely to turn urban. These tribal 
members therefore campaigned against the piped water project from within through collective resistance and 
direct confrontation with Local Government Officers from the GRDC. 
Chasing away Local Government Officers and removing land surveyors’ pegs not only demonstrates 
defiance and confrontation, but loyalty to the structure that defines the system of customary land tenure. 
Similarly, community residents of Gokwe demonstrated resistance and anger by attacking officials from the 
local authority when the government introduced a villagization programme in this communal area 
(Nyambara 2001). Villagization programmes involve relocation and reorganization of land use of rural 
households in terms of arable, grazing, and residential (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990). Elsewhere in northern 
Zimbabwe, residents of Dande communal area resisted a development project that aimed at land 
redistribution (Spierenburg, 2004). In another case, the community residents of Binga sabotaged a project by 
the RDC through selling communal land to migrants (Dzingirai, 2003). These reactions are similar to those 
of Kgatleng residents of Botswana against the imposition of legal rights on boreholes when the land 
administration authority failed to convince people about the project, and the residents were generally 
skeptical about the project (Peters, 1994). In Kenya, the Luo tribe clashed with government over the land 
titling programme because the Luo perceived the programme as a threat to their belonging and ancestral land 
rights (Shipton, 2004 in Mujere, 2011). According to Robins (1995) in Nyambara (2001:278), peasants have 
always resisted relocation of homesteads and consolidation of villages, and this took form of “attacks on 
state officials who come to peg new homes, the removal of pegs from home fields and yards, making the 
officials object of witchcraft, boycotting meetings, and so on”. In these cases, projects from the local 
authorities “caused a great deal of anger” since these were literally after land dispossession and displacement 
of people from their ancestral ‘soil’ (Peters, 1994:21). 
The perceptions of tribal members of Domboshava were thus shaped by possible dispossession, loss of land 
rights, and many freedoms (cf. Cousins, 2008a). The ‘freedoms’ of tribal members entail autochthonous land 
rights, choices to bequeath land and other property rights through inheritance, choices to exchange land, 
choices to access the commons, and above all the right to belong to this communal area. Loyalty to 
customary land tenure by tribal members of Domboshava is rather a forced alternative and not necessarily a 
rational initiative in order to preserve their freedoms as well as belonging (cf. Hirschman, 1970). 
7.3 Migrant members’ reactions to rezoning strategies, and the reasons for their actions  
On the other hand, the reactions of migrants were different. Migrants perceived rezoning and provision of 
services through the water project from GRDC as worthwhile. In their minds, rezoning could lead to 
improved living conditions concomitant with urban spaces. Migrants thus looked forward to upgrading of 
Domboshava from rural to urban. Many migrants were rather uncomfortable with and uncertain of their 
migrant status associated with squatters by the GRDC since they were unregistered through the formal 
procedures. Migrants that bought land through individualized land transactions such as direct land sales and 
land grabs were legally categorized as squatters (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002; TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001). 
In the minds of migrants, rezoning would secure their land rights since in most cases these migrants were 
victims of displacement through the FTLRP and OM/ORO. If Domboshava turns urban, the context allows 
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for formal registration of individual land parcels with the GRDC, and land would be considered as urban 
with title. Land titles are “preemptive”, that is, they prevent the state from allocating the same pieces of land 
to others (Migot-Adholla, 1994:25). As such, land titles confer absolute and legal private property land 
ownership rights to migrants. Migrants of Domboshava therefore expected to obtain land titles through 
rezoning. 
Migrants regard Domboshava as urban due to its proximity with Harare. However, Domboshava is rural 
since the peri-urban area is categorized under communal areas in policy terms (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). 
Some migrants however support settlement upgrading from rural to urban because they retain their tribal 
status in their homelands. Such land rights legitimize their land claims even after migrants’ long absence. 
Migrants had nothing to lose in terms of autochthonous land rights in Domboshava through land 
dispossession by the GRDC, but probably could gain titled and private land rights through rezoning. 
According to Hirschman (1970), migrants’ perceptions typify neither voice nor exit, but rather loyalty to 
rezoning. Loyalty in this regard, translates to waiting in anticipation for an improvement. Being loyal also 
entails patience (Hirschman, 1970; Ayes, 1971; Barry, 1974; Dowding et al., 2000). For migrants, waiting 
patiently for transformation from rural to urban is a significant and a calculated alternative rather than to use 
overt strategies such as voice or to exit. Engaging voice was somewhat tricky and difficult for some 
unregistered migrants because of their ‘illegal’ migrant status in Domboshava. Migrants were simply 
sticking with the status quo while waiting for change come. Loyalty also provides an explanation to the 
standard and state of the art houses constructed by migrants in Domboshava. Such modern and often gated 
structures are unlikely to be demolished during clean-up exercises. These residential structures stand a better 
chance of being integrated into the GRDC’s master plan for Domboshava. Demolition of physical structures 
involves compensation to the owners (RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001). This is often an insurmountable task 
for local authorities in Zimbabwe as they struggle financially to meet most of their budgetary requirements. 
Construction of permanent and modern structures by migrants is however a way of securing land rights, and 
to remain safe from the GRDC’s non-planning interventions akin to ORO/OM associated with the rezoning 
strategy on settlement upgrading. 
8 CONCLUSION 
Findings from the case of Domboshava clearly show that the rezoning strategy does not necessarily focus on 
what community residents expect, but on what laws expect in terms of land and settlement in this peri-urban 
communal area. The behaviour of tribal members also demonstrates resistance not only to the rezoning 
strategy they regarded as undesirable, but also to the structure on customary land tenure they regarded as 
confusing. As a result, tribal members were simply exiting the structure or rules that regulate customary land 
tenure as described in statutes on land and settlement through unsanctioned land transactions. Statutes 
capacitate and constrain (at the same time) individual freedom of tribal members to exercise their land rights. 
In the minds of tribal members of Domboshava, exiting these institutions is a worthy cause because the 
structure failed to protect their customary land rights against possible dispossession by the GRDC. Tribal 
members are content with their rural and tribal status that allows them to practice inheritance for their 
descendants. 
Clearly, a conflict of values exists between tribal members and migrants in terms of gains and losses attached 
to rezoning. Among tribal members, settlement upgrading is associated with loss of land rights, whereas 
migrants equate the programme with access as well as secure land rights through land titles. Future scenarios 
however predict a complex combination of resistance to rezoning by tribal members that preserved their land 
parcels for their future generations against those that resigned and totally exit the system of customary land 
tenure through land sales to migrants. The latter group of tribal members is likely to support rezoning 
through settlement upgrading. On the other hand, migrants are likely to team up with tribal members that 
hold small residential land parcels in support of rezoning through settlement upgrading. Appropriate 
planning strategies that address the challenges in Domboshava are sorely needed. 
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